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NOTES
A FAIR AND EQUITABLE PLAN UNDER SECTION 77B
After the requisite consents of the various security holders and
stockholders are obtained,' section 77B of the Brankruptcy Act
provides that the plan of reorganization shall be confirmed by
the judge if he be satisfied that "it is fair and equitable and
does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors
or stockholders * * * ''2
No all-inclusive tests of such fairness and equitableness as will
satisfy the above requirement have yet been stated by the courts.
They have variously said that "77B doesn't require that every
plan approved as fair and equitable shall withstand attack by
non-assenting creditors asserting their strict legal rights, un-
affected by any principles of the Bankruptcy Act,"3 and "that the
courts will scrutinize with care all plans of reorganization * * *
to make certain that assets belonging to creditors are not by
indirection being diverted to stockholders." 4 A more helpful test
is that suggested in In re Dutch Woodcraft Shops,5 under which
"a plan of reorganization must meet two requirements: (1) it
should give to each creditor and stockholder the value of his
interest in the debtor's assets, and (2) it should fully recognize
the priority of claims. The omission of any group while a lower
ranking group, either of stockholders or creditors, is included
will render the plan unfair and inequitable." This definition of
fairness suggests two questions: (1) Shall we determine the
value of the security holder's or stockholder's interest in the
debtor's property on the basis of such property's liquidation
value, or with a view to the business future of the debtor as a
going concern? 6 and (2) In what manner must these old prior-
ities be recognized in reorganization?
1. (1934) 48 Stat. 918, (1937) 11 U. S. C. A. 207 (e) (1), which requires
that each plan be approved by two-thirds in interest of each class of credi-
tors and a majority in interest of stockholders.
2. (1934) 48 Stat. 919, (1937) 11 U. S. C. A. 207 (f) (1).
3. Downtown Inv. Ass'n v. Downtown Metropolitan Bldgs., Inc., (C. C. A.
2, 1936) 81 F. (2d) 314; In re Peyton Realty Co. (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1936)
18 Fed. Supp. 822. It is submitted that this test is not very helpful since
11 U. S. C. A. 207 (b) (1) provides that a plan of reorganization within
the meaning of this section "shall include provisions modifying or altering
the rights of creditors generally," and 11 U. S. C. A. 207 (b) (2) provides
that such plan "may include provisions altering or modifying the rights
of stockholders generally."
4. In re New York Railways Corporation (C. C. A. 2, 1936) 82 F. (2d)
739,744.
5. (D. C. W. D. Mich. 1935) 14 Fed. Supp. 467.
6. In re Witherbee Court Corporation (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 251.
The property valued as that of the going concern has been held the true
basis.
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I. FAIRNESS AS BETWEEN JUNIOR AND SENIOR
SECURITY HOLDERS
There are two main schools of thought concerning the proper
preservation of priorities in reorganization.7 One maintains that
the priority of any class as to (a) its rights on dissolution and
(b) its claims on the earnings of a concern must either be com-
pletely maintained or, to the extent that they are invaded, must
be represented by some quid pro quo.8 Thus old six percent
debentures would be entitled to new six percent preferred stock,
par for par, including of course any unpaid interest, if the old
common stock is to receive all the new common stock; or the
old debenture holders might accept one-half of their claim in new
preferred stock, giving up the other half in exchange for an
unlimited participation in assets and earnings, to be represented
by a fair share of the new common stock as the quid pro quo for
the invaded priority. The second view does not require that
invaded priorities be compensated for to render a plan fair. All
that is necessary is a relative reduction in the rights of inferior
security holders and stockholders to the debtor's income and
property."
In determining which theory the courts have followed in their
interpretation of 77B, comparison with section 77, the Railroad
Reorganization Act, may afford a useful analogy. Section 77
provides that a plan of reorganization shall be approved which
is fair and equitable, affords due recognition to the rights of
each class of creditors and stockholders, and does not discrimi-
7. Bonbright and Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of
Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 127.
8. In Finletter, Principles of Corporate Reorganization (1937) 390, the
author suggests other possible views. (A) An old class might be entitled to
receive new securities having a market value equal to the face amount of
their old claim before any Junior Class could be given anything; this would,
however, treat a reorganization as a liquidation and has never been adopted
by the courts. (B) Any plan which gives an old senior class something
more either in market value, or in priority of position, than the class junior
to it, might be approved if on the whole the result is not offensive to a
sense of fairness. It is suggested that this latter view probably has a prac-
tical appeal, but the author believes that the cases do not sustain this view,
and that it is in conflict with an appreciation of a judicial reorganization.
"Reorganization is not a general scrapping of vested rights. It is a readjust-
ment of the capital structure of a continuing enterprise at a given point of
its career." But see Note (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 547, 562.
9. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the
Last Decade (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 901,914. "The test of fairness is whether
each class of security holders, which retain any interest in the property
retain approximately its relative position with respect to the other security
holders." Cf. Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Reorganization (1935) 44 Yale
L. J. 923.
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nate unfairly.'0 This "due recognition" clause is not present in
section 77B.11 A possible implication from this omission is that
a plan of reorganization pursuant to section 77B need not in-
variably preserve old priorities, but that a plan might be ap-
proved as fair which invades priorities, giving no compensating
quid pro quo, provided that similar rights of inferior security
holders and stockholders suffer a corresponding reduction to
satisfy the requirement that the plan be non-discriminatory.' 2
The cases which have arisen to date substantiate the relative
priority theory. They hold in effect that a plan of reorganiza-
tion is fair and equitable which invades old priorities without
giving in return a compensating quid pro quo if a like reduction
is made in rights of inferior holders 3 and if such reductions
are necessary for successful rehabilitation of the debtor.1' In
re Anchor Post Fence Company- illustrates admirably a plan
of this type approved by the court as complying with section 77B.
In that case bond maturities were extended and interest thereon
reduced from 6 %% to 5%, payable only out of available earn-
ings; unsecured claimants were given non-negotiable and non-
interest bearing long-term notes; preferred shareholders' inter-
est rates were reduced from 8% cumulative to 6% cumulative,
retroactive as to accumulated interest, with no dividends to be
paid until the outstanding bonded indebtedness was reduced
50%, and the notes given trade creditors paid in full; common
stockholders retained their old status, except that no dividends
were to be paid thereon until the outstanding bonded indebted-
ness was reduced 75% and the notes given unsecured creditors
were paid in full. The debtor was solvent in the brankruptcy
sense, but met the insolvency requirements of section 77B by
virtue of inability to meet maturing debts. 6 Hence, although
the debtor's assets were appraised by the court at a figure in
excess of outstanding liabilities, the creditors were forced
10. (1935) 49 Stat. 918, (1937) 11 U. S. C. A. 205 (e) (1).
11. (1934) 48 Stat. 919, (1937) 11 U. S. C. A. 207 (f) (1).
12. It is not suggested that sec. 77 requires an absolute preservation of
priorities in reorganization or that a plan under 77 might not be sustained
which did not provide quid pro quo for invaded priorities.
13. There would seem to be room for doubt as to the constitutionality of
such a doctrine, since it appears to involve the taking of a substantial pro-
perty interest with no compensation given therefor. This may well be in-
consistent with the requirement of due process.
14. In re Pressed Steel Car Co. of New Jersey (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1936) 16
Fed. Supp. 329; In re New York Railways Corporation (C. C. A. 2, 1936)
82 F. (2d) 739.
15. (D. C. D. Md. 1936) 14 Fed. Supp. 801.
16. (1934) 48 Stat. 912, (1937) 11 U. S. C. A. 207 (a).
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through the plan to suffer an impairment of security, with no
return therefor.
17
In In re New Rochelle Company, 8 involving a debtor, solvent
but unable to meet maturing obligations, old first mortgage inter-
est rates were reduced from 6% to 4%, while unsecured creditors
were given the option to take either one-third the face value of
their claims in bonds or full payment in non-interest bearing
notes maturing within two years. Each note contained a cancel-
lation clause, whereby upon default in the payment of any, all
notes should become due immediately, and all noteholders be
forced to take a pro rata part of the bonds not taken under the
options, in full satisfaction. Though it was clear that such re-
maining bonds might not equal the face value of the outstanding
notes, the plan was approved. Here again, although the debtor's
assets were appraised at a sum sufficient to satisfy all claimants,
dissenting bondholders were forced to accept a decrease in inter-
est, while objecting unsecured creditors were compelled to take
bonds of a face value much less than that of their claims or full
payment in non-interest-bearing, later maturing notes, payment
of which was uncertain. The court, in approving the plan,
17. Note the detailed manner provided for the application of net earn-
ings under the plan. 15% was to be used for working capital, and such
part of the remainder as might be required, for the payment of interest,
accumulated and future on 5% bonds; the balance, if any, was to be
applied to the reduction of notes issued for unsecured claims. After the
notes were retired, 15% of the net earnings were to be applied to working
capital, such of the balance as might be necessary for the payment of inter-
est on the 5% bonds, and 50% of the remainder toward a sinking fund for
the payment of bonds. Furthermore a committee of six bondholders, or their
nominees, appointed initially by the court, with power in said committee
to fill vacancies, was to have a veto power over the sale of any of the
company's mortgaged property free from the lien. This committee was to
function until the debtor's bonded indebtedness was reduced from $349,000
to $100,000. In re Anchor Post Fence Co. (D. C. D. Md. 1936) 14 Fed.
Supp. 801. In determining the extent of a security holder's priority and the
amount of claim he had in reorganization, unpaid interest is to be included.
In re 333 North Michigan Ave. Building Corporation (C. C. A. 7, 1936)
84 F. (2d) 936, involving a plan, held fair and equitable, for a solvent debtor
whereby first mortgage bondholders received no-par preferred stock and
certain common stock, while inferior security holders and shareholders
received new common stock; cf. Security First National Bank of Los An-
geles v. Rindge Land and Navigation Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1936) 85 F. (2d) 557,
107 A. L. R. 1240; In re Tennessee Publishing Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1936) 81 F.
(2d) 463; Francisco Building Corporation v. Battson (C. C. A. 9, 1936)
83 F. (2d) 93, holding that, if the requisite number of creditors fail to
assent to a plan, such plan does not provide adequate protection as required
by 11 U. S. C. A. 207 (b) (5), when it gives such creditors only a fraction
of the face value of their holdings. It is to be noted that the last three cases
involved the treatment of non-assenting classes of creditors, as to which the
requirements differ from those for assenting classes.
18. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 77 F. (2d) 881.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss4/10
stressed the fact of its approval by a large number of unsecured
creditors and the reasonable certainty of ultimate successful
rehabilitation of the debtor.' 9
In the cases so far discussed, the debtors were solvent in the
bankruptcy sense. Since creditors and stockholders alike held
a valuable interest in the debtor's property, these rights were
necessarily recognized by some participation in the reorganized
debtor.
A different problem is presented when creditors or stock-
holders with no equity in the old debtor are recognized in re-
organization. Any such recognition which does not first provide
for making the equity interest whole might be thought a violation
of due process as involving, in effect, a direct taking of priority
rights and giving them to the inferior interests. The courts,
however, have allowed this to be done over the objections of dis-
senting priority holders. For example, in Downtown Investment
Association v. Boston Metropolitan Buildings, Inc.,20 a debtor's
assets were sufficient to cover outstanding first mortgage bonds
but insufficient to pay second mortgage bondholders in full, leav-
ing no equity in the old stockholders. A reorganization plan was
sustained which extended the maturity of first mortgage bonds
and released unpaid interest thereon up to a certain date, while
second mortgage bondholders suffered similar reductions, and
new common stock was allocated between the first and second
mortgage bondholders and old stockholders. The court said that
the participation by the stockholders, who had no equity in the
debtor's property, and that of the second mortgage bondholders,
over and above the extent of their interest, would have been held
unfair under the rule of the old equity receivership cases,"2 but to
hold that the phrase "fair and equitable" has the same meaning
when applied to a reorganization under 77B as it had in equity
receiverships, is to eliminate from it, to a certain degree, the
rights of creditors and stockholders to adjust their respective
rights by contract, and nullify provisions of the act which was
19. Ibid. The court stressed the fact that the debtor had been operated
at a profit by a receiver pending reorganization, and in all likelihood would
be able to pay the notes given trade creditors as they matured. The opinion
does not indicate what was given old common shareholders. Cf. Horn v. Ross
Island Land and Gravel Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 64, holding unfair
a plan by which a solvent corporation proposed to pay its bondholders one-
fourth on the face value in cash as full satisfaction.
20. (C. C. A. 1, 1936) 81 F. (2d) 314.
21. Cf. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Boyd (1913) 228 U. S. 482, 33
S. Ct. 554, 57 L. ed. 931, and comment thereon in Finletter, Principles of
Corporate Reorganization (1937) 391.
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passed to facilitate corporate reorganization.22 Thus, over the
objections of dissenting bondholders, stockholders with no equity
in the debtor's property were given common stock in the reorgan-
ized debtor, without giving any quid pro quo, monetary or other-
wise, to the holders of the equity. Similarly in J. S. Farlee & Co.
v. Springfield-South Main Realty Co., Inc., 2 3 involving an insol-
vent debtor, a plan which left stock ownership intact and pro-
vided for a reduction on the bonded interest from 7% to 5%
was held fair and equitable. The opinion stressed the inability
of the debtor to pay more than 5% interest on the bonds and
argues that the number of objecting bondholders was highly
indicative of the inherent fairness of the plan. 24 The case may
be criticized in that, should the reorganized business prove suc-
cessful, the old bondholders have suffered an irreparable loss of
interest, while the common shareholders, who would have re-
alized nothing from a liquidation at the time of reorganization,
22. In In re Peyton Realty Co. (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1936) 18 Fed. Supp. 822,
823, the court said that sec. T7B creates an entirely new procedure designed
to facilitate corporate reorganization, and in particular to remove the diffi-
culties which arose from the emphasis which the courts had previously
placed upon the position of non-assenting minorities; and that Congress
is using the term "fair and equitable" in a new, broader sense than the
courts had in equity receiverships.
23. (C. C. A. 1, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 931.
24. Cf. In re Burns Bros. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1936) 14 Fed. Supp. 910,
which involved a reorganization of an insolvent debtor. Old class A common
shareholders with certain priorities in voting and income received one share
of new common stock for each ten old shares held, and class B common stock
received one share of new common stock for each fifty shares held. The
plan recognized old priorities between the stockholders in reorganization al-
though neither class of stockholders had an equity in the debtor's property.
A reasonable inference would seem to be that recognition of any such inter-
est in reorganization necessitates a participation of all old interest prior
thereto, though such old priority interests had no equity in the debtor's
property at the time of reorganization. This apparently is true, although
it has been held by the United States Supreme Court in In re Church St.
Building Corporation (1936) 299 U. S. 24, 57 S. Ct. 88, 81 L. ed. 16 that any
creditor, bondholder, or shareholder with no equity in the dedtor's property
at the time of reorganization, as determined by the court at that time,
may be excluded from a plan of reorganization without violating the due
process clause. See also In re Georgia Hotel Corporation (C. C. A. 7, 1936)
82 F. (2d) 917; In re Donohoe's, Inc., (D. C. D. Del. 1937) 19 Fed. Supp.
441; In re Parker Young Co. (D. C. D. N. H. 1936) 15 Fed. Supp. 965. But
see In re Consolidation Coal Co. (D. C. D. Md. 1935) 11 Fed. Supp. 594,
in which the court said, concerning the subscription warrants to new com-
mon stock, given old common stockholders having no equity in the debtor's
property at the time of reorganization: "The bondholders' committee have
urged, and not without force, that it would not have been unreasonable to
have provided in the plan that the old common stockholders be required to
pay $40 in place of $25 for the new common stock," thus indicating that the
courts will not sanction every type of participation of non-equity interests
without contributions on their part.
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have the "gravy." The courts, while confining the allocable par-
ticipation of these non-equity interests to common stock, have
failed to recognize that, in effect, a diversion of priority interests
to the inferior security or stockholders, which is seemingly unfair
and possibly a taking of property without due process of law,
is involved. As has been indicated, they have regarded such plans
as a valid exercise of composition, given by Congress pursuant
to its bankruptcy power ;25 and the question has never been
passed upon by the Supreme Court.
A related problem is involved when old inferior security hlod-
ers are allowed a participation in the reorganized debtor, senior
to that given old senior priorities. Such a plan was sustained in
In re Consolidation Coal Co.,26 in which the solvent debtor had
outstanding promissory notes, refunding 41/2% bonds, and first
and refunding 5% bonds, all of which the assets were more than
sufficient to pay in full. The approved plan, held fair and equi-
table, and not unduly discriminatory in favor of any class of
creditors, gave 4 %% bondholders, whose lien on the debtor's
property and income was inferior to that of the 5 % bondholders,
bonds of $500 par value, along with three shares of par $100
preferred stock, plus nine shares of $25 par value common
stock. Holders of each 5% bond received identical bonds of
$400 par, preferred stock, and twelve shares of $25 par common
stock. Thus the old inferior bondholders were given a lien of like
strength with that given the old priority bondholders, but $100
greater in par value. On the other hand the common stock inter-
est given the latter was greater than that given the former. The
opportunity for increased participation in earnings, by way of
the greater number of common shares given the old senior bond-
holders, was regarded as a fair bargain for the invaded prior-
25. The Bankruptcy Act (1898) 30 Stat. 459, (1927) 11 U. S. C. A. 30
(b) provides that the judge shall confirm a composition if he is satisfied
that "(1) it is for the best interest of the creditors * * *.' It has been held
under this section that if it can be shown that a liquidation of the bank-
rupt's property in the course of ordinary bankruptcy procedure will yield
substantially more than the offered composition, the proposal will not be con-
firmed over objection. In re Spiller District Court (D. C. D. Mass. 1916)
230 Fed. 490; Fleischmann and Devine, Inc., v. Saul Wolfsom Dry Goods Co.,
Inc., (C. C. A. 5, 1924) 299 Fed. 15. It may be argued that the requirements
of "fair and equitable" under sec. 77B were intended to mean substantially
the same as the above indicated interpretations of sec. 12 (b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, and hence if the reorganization plan does not provide a creditor
some type of security of a reorganized debtor equivalent in value to that
which would be received on a liquidation, such plan is necessarily unfair.
26. (D. C. D. Md. 1935) 11 Fed. Supp. 594. Note that on each $1,000
4%% bond, $175 accrued interest was outstanding, and $150 on each $1,000
5% bond.
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ity.27 The excellent business prospects of the debtor, reflecting
the potential value of the common stock, and the large majorities
assenting to the plan were held highly indicative of fairness.
The case indicates that old priorities may be surrendered to old
inferior security holders, provided the relinquishing priority
holders are recompensed by some compensating participation in
the reorganized debtor sufficient to protect them adequately.28
Another phase of the problem of fairness arises where, be-
cause of practical considerations, unsecured creditors are paid
in cash while secured creditors are given new securities, or suf-
fer impairment of their old ones. So long as such cash payments
are not execessive, such provisions will not be disapproved as
unfair or discriminatory.2 9 The position of the courts is that
the expense, necessarily entailed in requiring a security allot-
27. Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co. (1926) 271
U. S. 445, 46 S. Ct. 549, 70 L. ed. 1028 supports the doctrine of the principal
case. The plan in that case allowed an identical participation of old stock-
holders and debenture holders, the former paying a greater assessment
than the latter. The Court held that the plan afforded adequate protection
to the old debenture holders.
28. A reorganization plan may provide for reduction of interest rates on
old securities and stock. In re Parker Young Co. (D. C. D. N. H. 1936) 15
Fed. Supp. 965; J. S. Farlee Co., Inc., v. Springfield-South Main Realty
Co., Inc., (C. C. A. 1, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 931; In re Anchor Post Fence Co.
(D. C. D. Md. 1936) 14 Fed. Supp. 801. Maturities of old securities may
be extended. In re Georgian Hotel Corporation (C. C. A. 7, 1936) 82 F.
(2d) 917; In re Anchor Post Fence Co. (D. C. D. Md. 1936) 14 Fed. Supp.
801; but see In re Ogden Park Post Office Bldg. Corp. (D. C. N. D. E. D. Ill.
1936) 14 Fed. Supp. 413, holding that where the debtor had paid no interest
on its bonds since 1931, a maturity extension of such bonds for 15 years was
unreasonable; and Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Uni-
versity Evangelical Lutheran Church of Seattle (C. C. A. 9, 1937) 90 F.
(2d) 992, where it was held that a plan which left bondholders unpaid as
to principal in 25 years was unfair. In the foregoing cases the financial
condition of the debtor was poor, and the outlook for payment dubious. Cu-
mulative interest may be made non-cumulative. In re Anchor Post Fence
Co. (D. C. D. Md. 1936) 14 Fed. Supp. 801; In re Georgian Hotel Corp.
(C. C. A. 7, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 917. Sinking fund requirements may be
surrendered or altered. Downtown Inv. Ass'n v. Boston Metropolitan Bldgs.,
Inc., (C. C. A. 1, 1936) 81 F. (2d) 314. Accrued interest may be forfeited.
In re Anchor Post Fence Co. (D. C. D. Md. 1936) 14 Fed. Supp. 801;
Downtown Inv. Ass'n v. Boston Metropolitan Bldgs. Inc., (C. C. A. 1,
1936) 81 F. (2d) 314. No definite rule can be laid down as to the extent
to which the above-mentioned rights may be invaded in reorganization. The
limitation, established by the decided cases, appears to be that such impair-
ment of securities be necessary for the rehabilitation of the debtor, and
other inferior security holders suffer comparable impairment of security.
The courts are prone to declare these alterations unfair or discriminatory.
The number of assents to the plan is given great weight in the determina-
tion of the fairness of reductions. See (1934) 48 Stat. 914, (1937) 11 U. S.
C. A. 207 (b) (9).
29. Brocket v. Winkle Terra Cotta Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1936) 81 F. (2d)
949.
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mcilt to small claimants rather than cash, more than outweighs
an3 aipparent discrimination caused by cash distribution.3
T1., problem of the control of a reorganized corporation is of
prim importance to all parties concerned, and provisions in
regara to it are carefully scrutinized by the courts.31 Thus in
the reorganization of a solvent debtor approval of the plan was
conditioned on giving old bondholders and creditors adequate
representation in the corporate directorate. 32 In the case of an
insolvent debtor there would appear to be still more reason,
because of the financial status of the debtor, often the result of
poor management, and because reorganization always invades
priorities, for requiring that parties interested share in the
control of the debtor. The courts generally insist on adequate
representation in these situations33 and have even continued
30. Brcket v. Winkle Terra Cotta Co., supra, note 29; In re New
Rochelle Coal and Lumber Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 77 F. (2d) 881; cf.
Provident Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Philadelphia v. University Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church of Seattle (C. C. A. 9, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 992, which
involved a debtor church with liabilities of $63,808 and assets of $53,000
and where a proposed plan of reorganization which contemplated payment
of unsecured indebtedness of $140 while the first mortgage interest rate
was reduced from 6%,% to 2%, with a payment on the principal at a rate
which would leave an amount owing after 25 years and the payments were
not certain, was held unfair and a violation of due process of law as to
bondholders; cf. also In re McCrory Stores Corporation (D. C. S. D. N. Y.
1935) 12 Fed. Supp. 267, holding that a plan of reorganization which pro-
vided for participation by a creditor, who obtained his claim by means of
a trust relation with the debtor at a reduced price and just prior to reorgan-
ization, was unfair to other participants when such creditor was allowed
to participate at the par value of his claim. Sec. 77B (b) (3) provides
that a plan of reorganization shall provide for the payment in cash of all
costs of administration.
31. In re Consolidation Coal Co. (D. C. Md. 1935) 11 Fed. Supp. 594i
598: "Although there has been no serious objection raised to this aspect
of the plan [control], it is a vital one in all such reorganizations and there-
fore should not be approved by the court, even though not objected to by
any party in interest, if not believed by the court to be fundamentally
sound."
32. In re Anchor Post Fence Co. (D. C. Md. 1936) 14 Fed. Supp. 801,
where the shareholders were forced to change the personnel of the direc-
torate to give bondholders and creditors representation.
33. In re Burns Bros. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1936) 14 Fed. Supp. 910; In re
United Railways and Electric Co. of Baltimore's Reorganization (D. C. D.
Md. 1935) 11 Fed. Supp. 717; In re 333 North Michigan Ave. Bldg. Corp.
(C. C. A. 7, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 936. Cf. In re Barker Young Co. (D. C. D.
N. H. 1936) 15 Fed. Supp. 965, which involved an insolvent debtor. Under
the plan of reorganization here, preferred shareholders surrendered three-
fourths of their shares and accumulated interest, and the interest rate on
the shares retained was reduced, while common shareholders retained their
old status. Before reorganization preferred shareholders, on default in any
four consecutive quarterly interest payments were to have absolute voting
control. Under the new plan such control was to vest in them only after
default on six consecutive quarterly interest payments. The court said
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jurisdiction over the management of the debtor, after reorgani-
zation has been completed, by requiring court approval of cor-
porate acts.3 4 Under special circumstances, even in the case of
an insolvent debtor, a plan may be approved whereby old stock-
holders retain control. Thus, where preferred shareholders sur-
rendered 751% of their stock, the common shareholders retaining
their stock, and no other securities were outstanding, such a plan
was approved, inasmuch as the insolvency was not due to mis-
management, and the underwriters of new security, from which
necessary new capital was to be obtained by the debtor, insisted
that control remain in the old common shareholders."
Another important element bearing on the fairness of a
reorganization plan is the right of the various security holders
and stockholders inter se to participate in securities to be issued
to obtain new working capital. The problem becomes particu-
larly acute where the new security to be sold is superior to that
given the various old securities holders. The courts have gen-
erally held that there is no objection to selling senior security
to outsiders before offering it to a particular class. 3 On prin-
ciple it would seem that subscription rights to new security,
senior to that given an old priority holder, should not be sus-
tained without a prior offering to the old senior group.37 How-
ever, if the old equity receivership precedents are to be followed,
that it was neither fair nor equitable for preferred shareholders to sur-
render voting privileges, particularly since the plan authorized an unlimited
right to mortgage the property for such sums as the directors should decide.
In re Ogden Park Post Office Building Corporation (D. C. N. D. C. D. Ill.
1936) 14 Fed. Supp. 413, 414 involved a debtor whose common stock was
completely held by a corporation which was going through reorganization.
The court said, "The court cannot approve a plan in which the management
of a property is definitely committed to a debtor, the control of whose affairs
is dependent upon the result of another court proceeding." But see J. S.
Farlee & Co., Inc., v. Springfield-South Main Realty Co., Inc., (C. C. A. 1,
1936) 86 F. (2d) 931, where the old stockholders retained their interest in
the debtor as well as the control, the court declaring that the management
of the property was in reality a burden and approving the plan.
34. In re Clark Co. (C. C. A.,7, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 681. This view has
been criticized on the theory that while the most complete control by the
court over the debtor until the plan is finally approved is proper, any reser-
vation by the court of operating control after the plan is effected seems to
go beyond the purpose of the act. Finletter, Principles of Corporate Re-
organization (1937) 452.
35. In re Donahoe's Inc. (D. C. D. Del. 1937) 19 Fed. Supp. 441.
36. In re McCrory Stores Corporation (S. D. D. C. N. Y. 1935) 12 Fed.
Supp. 739, holding that old shareholders have no preemptive right to new
stock; In re New York Railway Corporation (C. C. A. 2, 1936) 82 F. (2d)
739.
37. In re New Rochelle Coal & Lumber Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 77 F. (2d)
881.
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no primary offering need be made to such holders if it appears
that the sale of such securities to other investors is a practical
way of obtaining new working capital.3 8 That result may be crit-
icized on the theory that valuable rights in the debtor's property
are being subverted to inferior security holders, since it is appar-
ent that the property value behind these new securities must be
substantially in excess of the sale price to insure such sale. The
equity receivership cases however, viewing the problem prag-
matically, have not regarded this as an unfair invasion of prior-
ities. The tenor of the 77B decisions indicates that this rule will
in all probability be followed. 39
II. FAIRNESS AS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE SAME CLASS
Once the classes of creditors are determined, the rule of strict
equality, with only such minor deviations as are necessary be-
cause of controlling practical reasons, prevails.40 Because of the
bookkeeping expense of carrying small claims in reorganization,
cash payments to minor claimants have been held fair, though
holders of larger claims of the same class have received new
securities or suffered various impairments of their securities.
4 1
Likewise, different treatment in reorganization may be permis-
sible if a particular member of a given class of creditors has a
separate and unliquidated claim against the debtor, the plan
providing a better treatment for that member. That has been
done as to compromised claims where the court had sufficient
facts before it to indicate that the compromise was fair.
42
The relative treatment in reorganization of holders of liens
on different portions of a debtor's property is an important one
which often arises, particularly with large corporations. The
courts have worked out the problem by requiring, as nearly as
possible, an apportionment of new securities to the respective
38. In re Jameson v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York (C. C. A. 7,
1937) 20 F. (2d) 808; In re Celotex Co. (D. C. D. Del. 1935) 12 Fed. Supp.
1, indicating the subscription rights to new stock may be awarded the vari-
ous classes as part of the rights received by them in lieu of their old
securities.
39. In re United Railways and Electric Co. of Baltimore's Reorganiza-
tion, (D. C. D. Md. 1935) 11 Fed. Supp. 717; In re 333 North Michigan
Ave. Bldg. Corp. (C. C. A. 7, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 936.
40. Finletter, Principles of Corporate Reorganization (1937) 430.
41. In re Anchor Post Fence Co. (D. C. D. Md. 1936) 14 Fed. Supp. 801;
cf. J. S. Farlee & Co., Inc., v. Springfield-South Main Realty Co. (C. C. A. 1,
1936) 86 F. (2d) 931, where a plan failing to provide for given creditors
within a class was held unfair.
42. In re Burns Bros. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1936) 14 Fed. Supp. 910, where
an unsecured claimant also held an unliquidated claim against the debtor for
breach of contract.
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lien holders based on the actual values that adhere to the respec-
tive properties each lien covers.43 This value is not the present
liquidation value but is estimated on the basis of its value as
property of a going concern."
III. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to formulate any statement of the precise factors
indicative of that fairness and equality required by section 77B.
The cases indicate that a plan of reorganization for a solvent
debtor will be approved which invades an old priority, provided
old inferior security holders' and stockholders' rights suffer a
corresponding impairment, 45 and provided the general impair-
ment is necessary for successful rehabilitation of the debtor.4"
No quid pro quo for invaded priorities need be given.' It further
appears that, although the debtor be insolvent and stockholders
or junior security holders have no equity in the debtor's property,
they may be given at least common stock in the reorganized
debtor despite an invasion of senior priority.4 A plan of re-
organization for a solvent corporation may invade old priorities
and even require their relinquishment to old inferior security
holders, provided the old priority holders are given some com-
pensating advantage, sufficient to adequately protect them.49
43. In re United Railways and Electric Co. of Baltimore's Reorganization
(D. C. D. Md. 1935) 11 Fed. Supp. 717. The debtor had outstanding 4%
and 6% consolidated bonds, the value of the property securing this lien
being less than that of a different part of the debtor's property represented
by certain underlying divisional bonds. The courts approved a plan
whereby the latter bondholders received new 5% first debentures, whose par
value was 50% that of the old bonds held, and 50% in 5% preferred stock,
while the former 6% and 4% consolidated bondholders received 50% of
the par value of their bonds in 4% first debentures, and 50% in 5% pre-
ferred stock. The difference in interest between the old 4% and 6% con-
solidated bonds was made up by giving holders of the latter one share of
common stock for each $100 bond.
44. In re United Railways & Electric Co. of Baltimore's Reorganization
(D. C. D. Md. 1935) 11 Fed. Supp. 717.
45. In re Pressed Steel Car Co. of New Jersey (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1936)
16 Fed. Supp. 329; In re New York Railways Corporation (C. C. A. 2, 1936)
82 F. (2d) 739; In re Anchor Post Fence Co. (D. C. D. Md. 1936) 14 Fed.
Supp. 801.
46. In re Pressed Steel Car Co. of N. J. (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1936) 16 Fed.
Supp. 329; In re New York Railways Corporation (C. C. A. 2, 1936) 82 F.
(2d) 739.
47. In re New Rochelle Coal & Lumber Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 77 F. (2d)
881; In re Consolidation Coal Co. (D. C. D. Md. 1935) 11 Fed. Supp. 594;
In re Anchor Post Fence Co. (D. C. D. Md. 1936) 14 Fed. Supp. 801.
48. Downtown Inv. Ass'n v. Boston Metropolitan Bldgs., Inc., (C. C. A. 1,
1936) 81 F. (2d) 314; J. S. Farlee & Co., Inc., v. Springfield-South Main
Realty Co., Inc., (C. C. A. 1, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 931.
49. In re Consolidation Coal Co. (D. C. D. Md. 1935) 11 Fed. Supp. 594.
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The courts have almost uniformly asserted that acceptance of
a proposed plan by the requisite percentage of parties interested
is strong evidence that it is fair and equitable, 5 and further that
if the number of those actively objecting to the plan is small,
this is still more strongly indicative of its fairness."1 In spite
of the express requirement of section 77B that the judge shall
approve the plan only if he himself is satisfied that it is fair
and equitable,52 it has been held that the proponents of a plan
meet all requirements as to the proof of its fairness by showing
that the requisite number of creditors, stockholders, and bond-
holders have assented to it. 58 Plainly there is, in practice at least,
a strong presumption of fairness as to any plan offered and a
correspondingly heavy burden on opponents to show such ill-
treatment as will truly shock the court's conscience.5-
WALTER HILGE.NDORF.
50. In re Burns Bros. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1936) 14 Fed. Supp. 910; In re
Pressed Steel Car Co. of New Jersey (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1936) 16 Fed. Supp.
329; Downtown Inv. Ass'n v. Boston Metropolitan Bldgs., Inc., (C. C. A. 1,
1936) 81 F. (2d) 314, indicating that the court will not disapprove a plan op-
posed by a comparatively small minority class of security holders, absent any
persuasive showing of unfairness and discrimination. It is indicated, how-
ever, that the weight of this evidence is much impaired if it appears that
some assents to the plan may have been due to ulterior reasons, not common
to that class of creditors or stockholders.
51. J. S. Farlee & Co., Inc., v. Springfield-South Main Realty Co. (C. C. A.
1, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 913. Here 78% in interest of bondholders expressly
approved the plan and but 3 % actively objected. The court declared that
the small number of objectors was indicative of fairness. But see Frank,
Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization
(1933) 19 Va. L. Rev. 698, criticizing the policy of the courts in giving such
great weight to the number of assents as being indicative of the fairness of
the plan. It is suggested that the widely scattered, poorly informed security
and stockholders, whose assents are solicited by self-constituted committees,
do not really assert an independent judgment in the matter. (1934) 48 Stat.
915, (1937) 11 U. S. C. A. 207 (b) (10) provides that the judge may dis-
regard the terms of any objectionable depositary agreements. See In re
Broadway Corporation (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 108.
52. (1934) 48 Stat. 919, (1987) 11 U. S. C. A. 207 (f) (1).
53. In re New Rochelle Coal and Lumber Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 77 F.
(2d) 881; but see First National Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem (1934)
290 U. S. 504, 54 S. Ct. 298, 78 L. ed. 465 (a pre-77B case indicating that the
proponents of a plan bear the burden of proving it fair).
54. See In re Studebaker Corp. (D. C. N. D. Ind. 1935) 9 Fed. Supp.
426; In re McCrory Stores Corp. (S. D. D. C. N. Y. 1935) 14 Fed. Supp. 739;
cf. Horn v. Ross Island Land and Gravel Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1937) 88 F. (2d)
64, where a solvent corporation proposed to pay certain of its bondholders
one-fourth the face value of their bonds in cash as a complete settlement.
Although the plan was held unfair, the court, in view of the large number
of assenting bondholders, gave the objecting bondholders a'lien on the
debtor's property for the face value of his claim and allowed the plan to
stand. "There is no reason why the bondholders who have expressly agreed
to the plan should not be bound thereby, and in default of objection by other
bondholders there seems to be no reason why they should not also be bound
to the order to which they, in legal effect, have concurred."
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